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Freeman: Constitutional Law: New Distaste for Equal Protection Analysis

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
NEW DISTASTE FOR EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS*
Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975)
Appellant wife's petition for divorce was dismissed by an Iowa trial court
for lack of jurisdiction' because she failed to meet the statutory requirement
that a petitioner be a resident of the state for one year preceding the filing of
the petition.2 Appellant then brought a class action s alleging that the Iowa
durational residency requirement for divorce was unconstitutional because it
discriminated against those who have recently exercised their right to travel
and because it denied access to the state's divorce courts. A three-judge federal
district court4 upheld the constitutionality of the statute.5 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed and HELD, the one-year durational
residency requirement for divorce is not a violation of equal protection because
of the state's interest in requiring divorce plaintiffs to be genuinely attached to
the state, nor is it a violation of due process, since there is not a total deprivation of access to divorce courts.6
For years, the constitutionality of durational residency requirements7 for
divorce appeared quite settled. Most states imposed such a requirment as a
condition for maintaining an action for divorce, 8 even though residency re*EDrroR's NOTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the winter 1975 quarter.
1. IowA CODE ANN. §598.9 (1971). "If the averments as to residence are not fully proved
*..the action [shall] be dismissed by the court."
2. IOWA CODE ANN. §598.6 (1971). "[MI]he petition for dissolution of marriage . . . must
state that the petitioner has been for the last year a resident of the State . . . and that the
maintenance of the residence has been in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining a
marriage dissolution only."
3. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§2281, 2284 (1970).
5. 360 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973). The three-judge district panel divided in votes
2-1, with Chief Judge McManus dissenting. Id. at 1185.
6. 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975) (White, Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Relying on Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1970), it was also held that the case was not moot even though
the durational residency requirement was satisfied by the time the case reached the Court
because the controversy remains alive for the class of unnamed persons whom appellant
represents. Justice White dissented solely on this issue because the appellant, no longer having any real interest, had lost the adversary quality necessary to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement.
7. Terminology among cases tends to be confusing. In this comment a "residency" requirement incorporates the common law concept of domicile-physical presence and intent to
remain. Many cases refer to a domiciliary resident as a bona fide resident. On the other
hand, a "durational residency" requirement refers to an additional waiting period, which
requires that a person be a resident for a designated time. See 405 U.S. at 343-44.
8. All states except Louisiana and Washington impose such a requirement. 95 S. Ct. at
560 n.15.
[839]
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quirements for divorce by their very nature divide residents into two classes,
new and old residents. 9 New residents are discriminated against in that they
are absolutely prohibited from initiating divorce proceedngs.1 ° This discriminatory treatment provoked recent challenges 1 to the constitutionality of such
state statutes on the ground that the classifications that result from the imposition of the residency requirement violated the equal protection clause.12
In determining the constitutionality of a statute that has been challenged
on equal protection grounds, the Supreme Court has enunciated two tests. If
the sole constitutional challenge is based on denial of equal protection, the
"traditional" equal protection test is applied.3 Under this lenient standard
the challenged statute will be approved unless it is found to be without any
reasonable basis, and therefore purely arbitrary. 1 4 This deferential "old" equal
protection standard with its minimal scrutiny usually presents no obstacle to a
finding of constitutional acceptability. 5
More recently, however, the Court has applied a "new" equal protection
test, which imposes a strict scrutiny on certain types of legislation. When a
statutory classification resulting in unequal treatment is based upon suspect
criteria's or infringes upon a fundamental right,'7 the "compelling state in9. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972). See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 238 (1970): "By definition, the imposition of a durational residency requirement
operates to penalize those persons . . . who have exercised their constitutional right of
interstate migration." (Brennan. White & Marshall, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
10. Cf. 405 U.S. at 334-35. The prohibition is "absolute" during the one-year waiting
period. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court held that indigents were
unconstitutionally denied access to divorce courts by their inability to pay a $60 filing fee.
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated: "[DJue process requires . . . that absent a
countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims
of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to
be heard." Id. at 377. In Sosna the state offered no "countervailing" justification for the
restriction upon the access to the divorce courts. The Court distinguished Boddie in that
indigents would be permanently denied access to the divorce court by their inability to pay
the required fee, whereas the residency requirement merely delayed their access for one
year. 95 S. Ct. at 563.
11. Compare Makres v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding a 6-month
residency requirement in Florida), with Mon Chi Heung Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219
(D. Hawaii 1973) (invalidating a one-year residency requirement).
12. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
13. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). Generally, this test
is applied in the area of economics and social legislation. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397

U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
14. Lindsley v. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). State legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, the laws
result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
15. See generally Note, Developments in the Law- Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.

1065 (1969).
16. Suspect criteria include national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 216
(1944); race, Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.

365 (1971).
17. Fundamental rights include voting, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); free
speech, Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.

618 (1969).
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terest" test is invoked. This test requires that the classification be necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest.'8 Judicial intervention under the
banner of the "new" equal protection test is usually fatal to the challenged
statute 9 because state interests are unlikely to withstand the heavy burden of
20
justification required by this stringent test.
Lately, certain members of the Court have become discontented with the
rigid two-tiered pattern of minimal scrutiny-validation and strict scrutiny-

invalidation.21 One approach has been to formulate an overarching inquiry
applicable to all equal protection cases. 22 Another approach, advocated by
Justice Thurgood Marshall, is the sliding scale analysis with the degree of

scrutiny determined by the constitutional significance of the interest affected
and the invidiousness of the classification. 23 Even though this latter rationale
was not adopted, it became clear that the Court was not employing'one, or two,

but a spectrum of standards in reviewing discriminations allegedly violative of
the equal protection clause.- Thus, the vitality of the two-tiered pattern of
25
analysis has become unsettled.
18. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 684 (1969) (emphasis in original). The statute
must also be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the state objective. 405 U.S. at 343,
citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
19. See Gunther, Foreword to In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
20. See 405 U.S. at 363-64 (Burger, J., dissenting): "To challenge such [state laws] by
the 'compelling state interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no
state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever
will, for it demands nothing less than perfection." But see Makres v. Askew, 500 F.2d 577
(5th Cir. 1974). Applying the strict equal protection test, the court sustained Florida's sixmonth residency requirement for divorce petitioners. The state's interest in protecting he
validity of its divorce decrees against collateral attack was held to be a "compelling interest." In Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St. 2d 155, 291 N.E.2d 580 (1972), a "compelling state
interest" was found to sustain the state's one-year divorce residence requirement.
21. See Gunther, supra note 19, at 17. See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The growing discontent manifested itself in two ways. First, there was a reluctance to add to either the list of fundamental rights, see, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra at 37; or
suspect criteria, see, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); which in turn limited the scope
of the new equal protection test. Second, there was a trend to strike down challenged
legislation without mentioning the strict scrutiny formula. Thus, the Court began to
acknowledge substantial equal protection claims on minimal scrutiny grounds. See, e.g.,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). This tendency did not square with the familiar
deferential tenor of the old equal protection test. See Gunther, supra note 19, at 19.
22. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Justice Powell's majority opinion stated that the underlying inquiry in equal protection cases is twofold: "What
legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights
might the classification endanger?" Id. at 173.
23. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice White endorsed the sliding scale analysis in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 456 (1973)
(concurring opinion): "[A]s the Court's assessment of the weight and value of the individual
interest escalates, the less likely it is that mere administrative convenience . . . will be sufficient to justify what otherwise would appear to be irrational discriminations." Id. at 459.
24. 411 U.S. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. See Gunther, supranote 19, at 19.
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In a line of cases dealing with challenged durational residency requirements, the threshold question has been whether to apply the minimal or strict
scrutiny standard of review. A durational residency requirement was subjected
to strict scrutiny in Shapiro v. Thompson,26 wherein newly arrived indigents
were required to wait one year before receiving state welfare benefits. The effect of the waiting period created two classes of needy families distinguishable
only on the basis of the length of residency.27 The Court recognized that the
waiting period impinged upon the constitutional right of interstate travel °- s
and therefore must be measured by the "compelling state interest" test, which
the state had failed to satisfy. -9 The Court's holding, however, was limited by
this caveat:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence requirements

. ..

Such requirements may promote compelling state

interests on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon
the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel30
Thus, the Court in Shapiro expressly stated that it did not purport to summarily outlaw all durational residency requirements.
Three years later in Dunn v. Blumstein,a1 a one-year residency requirement
that precluded newcomers from voting was found to be a violation of equal
protection under the strict scrutiny test.3 2 Those laws classified residents on the

basis of recent travel thereby directly penalizing the right to travel.3 The state
26. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
27. Id. at 627.
28. Although the right to travel is not mentioned in the Constitution, affirmation that
the right is "fundamental" came in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). "The constitutional right to travel . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union ....

[The] right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. . . . [Flreedom to

travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution." Id. at 757-58. For a general discussion of the possible sources within the Constitution, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 666-71 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. 394 U.S. at 638. The primary justification offered by the state was that the waiting
period was "a protective device to preserve the fiscal integrity of state public assistance programs." Other justifications offered and rejected were that the requirement (1) facilitated
budget planning, (2) provided an objective test for residence, (3) minimized fraud, and (4)
encouraged entry into the labor force. But evidence in the record reflected that the only
real objective of the durational residency requirement was to deter the ingress of indigents.
The purpose of restricting the in-migration by poor people was found to be constitutionally
impermissible. The Court recognized that a state has a valid interest in safeguarding the
fiscal integrity of its public assistance programs, but held that it may not accomplish such a
purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. Id. at 627-34.
30. Id. at 638 n.21 (emphasis in original).
31. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
32. Id. at 360. The state offered two basic purposes of the durational residency requirement for voting: to insure purity of the ballot box, and to assure a knowledgeable electorate.
Id. at 345. Recognizing that prevention of fraud was a "compelling goal," the Court nevertheless found there were less drastic means to accomplish that goal. Id. at 353-54. The Court
concluded that the relationship between the state interest in an informed electorate and a
fixed residency requirement was "simply too attenuated." Id. at 359-60.
33. Id. at 338. The "penalty" upon the right to travel was the absolute denial of the
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attempted to distinguish Shapiro by urging that the vice of the welfare statute
was its specific purpose to inhibit travel, while the residency requirement for
voting did not actually abridge the right to travel "in any constitutionally
relevant sense." 34 The Court dismissed this argument as a "fundamental misunderstanding of the law" and instead, emphasized that Shapiro was not based
upon any finding of actual deterrence upon interstate movement. 5 The Court
further stated that "any [statutory] classification which serves to penalize the
exercise of that right [to travel]" would trigger the compelling state interest
test.38 Thus, in broad dicta the Court concluded that durational residency re37
quirements must be judged by the strict scrutiny test.

Recently, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,38 a one-year durational residency requirement for free medical aid for indigents was invalidated. The Court recognized that Shapiro and Dunn had made it clear that
any classification that penalizes the exercise of the right to travel is invalid
unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest. 9 The penalties involved in prior right-to-travel cases were reviewed to determine whether the
denial of medical care was a penalty that would give rise to the compelling
interest test.40 The Court in MaricopaCounty reasoned that medical care is at
opportunity to vote. Thus, the stringent test was found to be applicable not only because
the right to travel was impinged upon, but also because the residency requirement denied
new citizens the franchise. Id. at 337.
34. Id. at 339.
35. Id. See Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807, 809-11 (1st Cir. 1970), for an excellent discussion on the penalty analysis and its relationship on the right to travel. Judge
Coffin states that "impingement on the right to travel does not have to rise to a fixed level
of deterrence." Id. at 810.
36. 405 U.S. at 340 (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 342. Nevertheless, in Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970),
afJ'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971), the Court declined to strike down a state statute requiring
one year of residence as a condition for receiving lower in-state tuition rates. The district
court concluded that the strict scrutiny test of Shapiro was not applicable because the residency requirement had no specific objective to exclude out-of-state students, nor did it deny
the basic necessities of life. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed and, although it did
not pass specifically on the appropriateness of the test, it is reasonable to assume tacit approval. The Court subsequently reaffirmed the Starns decision in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
411, 452 n.9 (1973). In Vlandis the Court held that a permanent, irrebuttable presumption
of nonresidency for the entire time a student remained at a state-supported university was
a violation of due process because it provided no opportunity for students to demonstrate
that they had become bona fide residents. The Court limited its holding to due process
grounds and stated that the decision should not be construed to deny a state the right to
impose upon a student, as one element of demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable
durational residency requirement.
The Court has also affirmed a district court decision that upheld a six-month residence
requirement for admission to the bar. The district court rejected the strict scrutiny test but
nevertheless expressed the view that the state's interest in assuring the quality and integrity
of the persons whom it licenses to practice law was a compelling interest. Suffiling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M.), aJ'd mem. sub nom., Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S.
1020 (1972).
38. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
39. Id. at 258.
40. Id. at 258-60. Both the denial of the franchise in Dunn and the denial of the basic
necessities of life in Shapiro were serious deprivations and thus impermissible penalties on
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least as much a basic necessity to an indigent as welfare assistance and that,
therefore, the durational residency requirement must be justified by a compelling state interest. 41 After examining the state's justifications for restricting
the free medical care, the Court concluded that the heavy burden had not been
met.

42

In the instant case the Court radically departs from the method of analyzing
durational residency requirements pursued since Shapiro.43 Although the district court had concluded the state's interest in establishing a waiting period
was "sufficiently compelling" to render the residency requirement constitutional, 44 the Supreme Court did not even refer to the strict scrutiny standard
of review. Instead of analyzing the statute in terms of either of the two equal
protection tests, the Court apparently utilized a balancing test 5 in which the
state's interest in requiring divorce plaintiffs to be genuinely attached to the
state was held to outweigh the constitutional objections of the individuals.4"
The Court recognized that residency requirements are not per se unconstitutional'4 an attempted to distinguish divorce residency requirements as
being of a "different stripe."' 8 The residency requirement for divorce was included in the statutory scheme of marriage and divorce laws, which consistently
9
has been recognized to be within the sole regulatory power of the states.'
the right to travel, which required imposition of the strict scrutiny test. On the other hand,
the denial of lower tuition rates was not such a penalty.
41. Id. at 259.
42. Id. at 269. The state offered two justifications: to insure fiscal integrity of its free
medical care program by discouraging an influx of indigents, and to serve administrative objectives of a convenient rule of thumb to determine bona fide residence, a useful tool for
preventing fraud and aiding budget predictability. Id. at 262-69.
43. 95 S.Ct. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. 360 F. Supp. at 1185. In dissent, Chief Judge McManus charged that the majority
had utilized some "unidentified test less stringent than strict equal protection" because the
state had offered no evidence to support any purportedly compelling justifications. Id.
45. 95 S. Ct. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 561. A balancing test was also utilized by the district court in Shiffman v.
Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225, 1233 (M.D. Fla. 1973). "[The degree of restriction on travel and
the nature of the right [to divorce] ... must ultimately be weighed and balanced in relation to the interest served by the restriction." On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit refused
to acknowledge such a flexible approach to equal protection analysis. Makres v. Askew, 500
F.2d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 (1974).
48. 95 S.Ct. at 561.
49. Id. at 559. Following the lead of California, Iowa was the second state to adopt the
concept of "no-fault" divorce. A divorce may be granted upon presentation of evidence that
the marriage relationship has "broken down" with no expectation of reconciliation. IOWA
COnE ANN. §598.17 (1971). Historically, the Court has recognized that the state has the
absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which a marriage may be created and dissolved. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877). On the other hand, the dissent argued
that the state also has had great interest and wide latitude in regulating the local voting
process. Yet it has been held that one regulation that states may not impose is an unduly long
residence requirement. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 300 (1972). Even though the state
traditionally has had exclusive responsibility for regulating family law matters, the dissent
pointed out that no legitimate objective would be frustrated by granting equal access to new
state residents. "A durational requirement such as Iowa's 90-day conciliation period would
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The Court proposed three justifications for the residency requirement. 50

First, the divorce plaintiff is not irretrievably foreclosed from the right to file
a divorce because the residency requirement merely delays access to the divorce
courts.51 The dissent argued, however, that it is unreasonable to believe that
when the year is over the divorce plaintiff will be made whole, for the waiting
period "prevents remarriage and locks both partners into what may be an
intolerable, destructive relationship." 52 The second justification offered is that

decrees *ofdivorce affect not only the interests of the marriage partners but also
other significant interests such as property rights, child custody and support,
which are dependent upon the adjudication.- Finally, the Court indicates

that the state has a vital interest in both avoiding a reputation as a divorce
mill and preventing collateral attacks on its divorce decrees.54 The Court con-

cluded that such residency requirements insure the future validity of the state's

55
judicial decrees against successful collateral attack.

not, of course, be subject to an equal protection challenge, as it is required uniformly of all
divorce petitioners." 95 S. Ct. at 569"n.4.
60. Justice Marshall in his dissient charged that "[t]he Court, however, has not only declined to apply the 'compelling interest' test to this case, it has conjured up possible justifications for the State's restriction in a manner much more akin to the lenient standard we have
in the past applied in analyzing equal protection challenges to business regulations." 95 S. Ct.
at 568.
51. Id. at 561; see note 10 supra.
52. 95 S. Ct. at 568-69 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'53. Id. at 561. This "amorphous justification" is no more persuasive to the dissent. "[B]y
declining to exercise divorce jurisdiction over its new citizens, Iowa does not avoid affecting
these weighty social concerns; instead, it freezes them in an unsatisfactory state that it would
not require long-time residents to endure." Id. at 569 n.3. The Court in the instant case has
seemingly ignored the doctrine of "divisible divorce" in which the divorce proceeding has
two separate aspects - the dissolution of the marital relationship and the determination of
rights and obligations created by the marriage. See Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464, 472
(Fla. 1950). Under this theory, the concern of the Court with property rights, alimony, and
child custody would be nullified, since an ex parte divorce would only sever the bonds of
matrimony and the divorcing courts would have no jurisdiction over other interests. The
Court has apparently approved the concept of "divisible divorce." See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S.
541, 549 (1948).
54. 95 S. Ct. at 561. The states' fear of collateral attack upon their divorce decrees became
manifest after the Court's decision in Williams v.°North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). Although jurisdiction to grant a divorce is founded on domicile, it was held that an ex parte
divorce proceeding, the factual determination of domicile by the courts of the divorcing state
is not binding upon the courts of another tate. Id. at 236.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 562. The dissent argued that the state's legitimate interests in avoiding a
divorce mill reputation and preventing collateral attacks could be protected by a simple requirement of domicile. For several reasons the waiting period does not seem necessary nor
much of a protection. First, a state may avoid becoming a haven for divorce seekers by making good-faith determinations of domicile. Second, because a collateral challenge is not
permissible if both spouses are before the divorcing court, the residency requirement "sweeps
too broadly:' since it imposes a one-year waiting period regardless of whether or not the
divorce proceeding is ex parte. Third, a waiting period will do nothing to preclude collateral attack; it merely makes successful collateral attack less likely. Finally, because a
divorce decree may be subject to collateral attack for any jurisdictional flaw that would void
it in its own state, and because the residence requirement in Iowa has been interpreted to
be of jurisdictional import, failure to prove one-year's residence may provide an independent

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 8
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

In a forceful dissent, Justice Marshall declared that the Court's failure to
follow the Shapiro principle suggests a "new distaste" for equal protection
analysis in durational residency requirement cases.5 6 As the dissent points out,
the threshold determination should be whether the denial to newcomers of the
right to obtain a divorce constitutes an impermissible penalty on interstate
travel.5 7 Justice Marshall indicated that the Court's previous decisions 5- made
it plain that the right to dissolution of the marital relationship is of such
fundamental importance that its denial penalized interstate travel and, under
Shapiro, this denial must be justified by a compelling state interest. 59 In the
case sub judice, however, the majority failed to apply the strict scrutiny standard of review clearly mandated by Shapiro.
The principal case has also definitively rejected the broad language in
Dunn that all durational residency requirements must be examined using a
compelling interest test.60 Furthermore, it has added new life to the Shapiro
caveat 1 that residency requirements are not per se unconstitutional and will
not automatically be found to penalize the right to travel.62
On the other hand, the lack of clarity concerning the applicable standard
of review may have far-reaching repercussions. First and most obvious, is that
lower courts in the future are bound to be perplexed when confronted with a
challenged residency requirement. The threshold question will continue to be
which level of scrutiny to apply.63 Possibly the courts may follow a penalty
analysis to determine whether the governmental benefit withheld during the
waiting period is of sufficient import that its denial is a serious deprivation and
thus a constitutionally impermissible penalty on the right to travel. But the
penalty analysis itself is unclear. For instance, Shapiro did not indicate the

degree of penalty that would be necessary to invoke the compelling interest
test, 64 nor was any light shed on the subject in Maricopa County when the

Court purportedly applied the penalty analysis.65 To date findings of "penalties" have been limited to basic necessities that are urgently needed 66 and to

basis for challenge, which would increase rather than reduce the exposure to collateral attack.
Id. at 570-71.
56. 95 S. Ct. at 567 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967). See also Foster, Marriage:A "Basic Civil Right of Man," 37 FORDHAm L. REv. 51
(1968).
59. 95 S. Ct. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
61. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969).
62. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 (1974).
63. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 30, 35 sufpra. See also Note, Constitutional Law Equal
Protection -Penalty

on the Right To Travel-Durational Residency Requirements, 1973

Wis. L. REv. 914, 921.
65. 415 U.S. 250, 256-59 (1974); see text accompanying note 40 supra.
66. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (free medical care); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare).
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sacred constitutional rights. 67 The question still remains whether the scope of
the penalty analysis will continue to be so restricted.
Second, and yet not quite so obvious, is the possible denigration of the
right to travel. Since Shapiro it has been thought that the right to travel was
clearly established as a fundamental right. 68 But in the instant case the Court
failed to acknowledge that a durational residency requirement could erect a
real and purposeful barrier to movement. 69 Although the Court seemingly
recognizes the right to travel, this case demonstrates that it may not be considered a basic fundamental right with an independent significance. Instead,
the right to travel may merely be a judicial tool by which the Court has ensured that indigents will not be deprived of welfare benefits or medical care.
Third, the instant case evidences the Court's current tendency to avoid the
stringent equal protection test without directly overruling Shapiro. Arguably,
this case is yet another step toward a total demise of the short-lived, two-tiered
equal protection analysis and the substitution of a more overarching, traditional balancing approach. 70 It is possible that the Court never intended to
create such a broad principle and may now be retreating toward a more noninterventionist stance in the equal protection area. On the other hand, the
principal case may have carved a sweeping exception to the basic rule of strict
scrutiny, which may be applicable to the pervasive area of state-regulated family affairs.

71

Whatever the ultimate parameters of the equal protection test, the Court
has apparently perceived the problem of potential fraudulent assertions of
domicile to be such a serious intrusion of the state's interest as to outweigh the
harm caused to many divorce plaintiffs who are legitimate residents and yet are
barred from the divorce courts. The difficulty with this reasoning is that the
fraud is merely hypothetical while the resulting harm caused by the rigid
67. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting).
68. See note 28 supra.
69. Consider the hypothetical yet realistic situation in which a divorce plaintiff attempts
to withdraw from the complex psychological problems accompanying an unstable marital relationship by moving to the home of relatives in a different state. If a residency requirement
of the new state absolutely bars access to the courts, the divorce plaintiff will remain in an
injurious atmosphere. The exercise of the right to migrate, settle, and start a new life will
no longer be an available option. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 623 (1969). The
hypothetical posed is analogous to the fact situation involving Vivian Thompson, who returned to live with her mother and subsequently applied for welfare benefits when her
mother could no longer support her.
70. See note 46 supra.
71. Cf. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). In a 5-4 decision the Court upheld the
allegedly discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in Louisiana's intestacy statutes. Although
the majority admitted that the laws were discriminatory, "the power to make rules to
establish, protect and strengthen family life . . . is committed by the Constitution of the
United States ... to the legislature of [the] state. Absent a specific constitutional guarantee,
it is for that legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this Court, to select from among
possible laws." Id. at 538-39. Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan charged that the state
inheritance laws were within the meaning of "state action" and as such were open to attack

under the fourteenth amendment. To hold otherwise "would reverse a century of constitutional adjudication under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses." Id. at 548-49.
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